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Growth of technological variety offers more scope for the division of labor.  And when a division
of labor requires some specific training, the technological specificity of human capital grows and,
with it, probably the firm specificity of that capital. We build a simple model that captures this observation.
The model implies that a rising specialization of human and physical capital raises the rents in the
average match between a firm and its human and physical capital. We document that in the last 40
years the firm’s share of those rents has also grown, and we use the model to explain why this shift
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Abstract
Growth of technological variety oﬀers more scope for the division of labor.
And when a division of labor requires some speciﬁc training, the technological
speciﬁcity of human capital grows and, with it, probably the ﬁrm speciﬁcity
of that capital. We build a simple model that captures this observation. The
model implies that a rising specialization of human and physical capital raises
the rents in the average match between a ﬁr ma n di t sh u m a na n dp h y s i c a l
capital. We document that in the last 40 years the ﬁrm’s share of those rents
has also grown, and we use the model to explain why this shift may have taken
place.
1 Introduction
The division of labor may be limited by the extent of the market as Smith (1776)
argued, but it clearly is also limited by the variety of technology.1 Aw o r l dh y p o t h e t -
ically populated by trillions of cavemen would, in spite of its large market, probably
oﬀer little opportunity for labor to specialize — cavemen could ﬁnd very few activities
to specialize in since stone-age technology comprised very few distinct tasks. And
when a division of labor requires some speciﬁc training, the technological speciﬁcity
of human capital is limited by the variety of technology. This likely means that the
ﬁrm speciﬁcity of that capital is limited by the same thing: Technological variety.
This paper will model this hypothesis more carefully and use it to understand some
recent trends in ﬁrms’ earnings and stock prices, and in the management premium.
∗We thank S. Engerman, A. Hortacsu, D. Neal, and M. Perry for helpful comments, Matthias
Kredler for research assistance, and the National Science Foundation and the Kauﬀman Foundation
for support.
†Jovanovic: Department of Economics, New York University. Rousseau: Department of Eco-
nomics, Vanderbilt University.
1Technological variety can be (and has been) treated as an endogenous variable that might even
be aﬀected by the size of the market. Indeed, the model that we present makes variety endogenous,
although not in the standard IO fashion.
1Over the past 35 years, the United States has seen a high rate of growth in the
variety of products and in the variety of technologies used to produce them. For the
period from 1971 to 2006, for example, the stock of patents grew at an annual rate of
1.9 percent and trademarks grew at 3.9 percent.2 Alternatively, patenting ﬂows grew
at 3.4 percent and trademarking ﬂo w sa t8 . 6p e r c e n tp e ry e a r .T h er i s ei np a t e n t i n g
w a sn o tam e r ei n c r e a s ei nd u p l i c a t i o n( s e eK o r t u ma n dL e r n e r ,1 9 9 9 ) ,a n dt h u sw e
can be reasonably certain that the number of distinct technologies in use is vastly
larger today than it was 40 years ago.
The number of business establishments also grew, though at the slower rate of
1.6 percent per year.3 Thus a ﬁrm controls an ever smaller fraction of available
technologies, and produces an ever smaller fraction of available products. The reason
for this is presumably some sort of managerial ‘span of control’ argument in which
a manager cannot eﬃciently oversee a diverse set of activities. Lucas (1978) models
the span of control limitation in terms of a ﬁrm’s employment in a single production
function for a single good. Extensions to many activities are done by Jovanovic
(1993) with symmetric products, and Mitchell (2000) where some products suit the
ﬁrm better than others. Mitchell assumes that a ﬁrm loses eﬃciency when the goods
and services that it sells start to diﬀer more and more from its core competence.
A ﬁrm’s core competence presumably depends on the type of capital — human
and physical — that is housed in the ﬁrm, and an eﬃcient ﬁrm is one that sells goods
a n ds e r v i c e st h a tm a t c hw e l lt h eh u m a nc a p i t a lo fi t sw o r k e r s . T h e r e f o r eaﬁrm’s
eﬃciency depends on the quality of the match between its workers and the goods and
services that it sells. The quality of this match is the focus of our model. We shall
assume that the growth of product variety has led to an increase in the dispersion of
the quality of the ﬁrm-worker match. In other words, that there has been an increase
in the ﬁrm speciﬁcity of human capital. We shall show that such a rise in speciﬁcity
may explain why over the past thirty-ﬁve years
1. Firms’ earnings have risen,
2. Tobin’s Q and the management premium have risen with no accompanying rise
in productivity growth, and
2To obtain the growth rate of the stock of patents, we start with the total number of “utility” (i.e.,
invention) patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce for 1963-2006 (www.uspto.gov)
and the Historical Statistics of the United States (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, series W-
96, pp. 957-959) for 1790-1962. We then take the cumulative number of patents granted up to
1970 as the starting point for computing growth rates for 1971 to 2006. The number of registered
trademarks are from Historical Statistics (series W-107, p. 959) for 1870-1969 and various issues
of the Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract of the United States for later years. For trademarks,
we use the cumulative number issued from 1870 to 1970 as the starting point for the growth rate
calculation.
3We build a series for the number of business establishments using various issues of the Statistical
Abstract 1980-2003, linearly interpolating between missing values in 1981-84 and 1986-87. We then
join this series with the number of business concerns from the Statistical Abstract for 1970-80.
23. Labor turnover has declined, but not managerial turnover.
A summary of the argument.–Our argument runs as follows: Rising specialization
of ﬁrms and their inputs has forced ﬁrms to try harder to ﬁnd those inputs that suit
their needs best. Management has the task of ﬁnding the right inputs; its role and
its reward have therefore risen. When a ﬁrm has its IPO or when it is acquired, its
price is now higher because it includes this (now higher) “assembly fee.” If this rise
in price is ﬁnanced partly through additional debt that the new entity inherits, ﬁrms’
earnings (which include payments to debt-holders) will rise while ﬁrms’ proﬁts (which
exclude them) will also rise but by less. The model thus connects the ﬁrm speciﬁcity
of inputs to the share of output captured by management, and can therefore explain
the simultaneous rise of the managerial premium and the rise in the earnings of ﬁrms.
In our paper, management performs a general function, that of ﬁrm assembly.
Management capital has not become more ﬁrm speciﬁc, but the capital of the assem-
bled assets has — so the argument runs. This diﬀerence is critical for comparing our
model with that of Lustig, Syverson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007, ‘LSV’), and the
evidence on managerial turnover is especially helpful for making the comparison. In
LSV’s model, a rising q is driven by forces that raise the attachment of managers
to ﬁrms. LSV argue that the organizational capital of ﬁrms depreciates more slowly
now than thirty years ago so that the longevity of establishments and the tenure of
their managers rises, i.e., their turnover falls.
The plan of the paper.–Section 2 documents the three facts listed above. Section
3 gives a simple example around which the model revolves. Section 4 presents the
model itself. Section 5 simulates the model and compares it to data. Section 6
discusses the nature of the information capital that our paper focuses on, and we
draw our conclusions together in Section 7.
2T h e m a i n f a c t s
This section documents the three claims listed in the introduction. Here we are
stressing trends, not waves. We divide the evidence into categories, based on whether
it motivates the assumptions, or whether it is explained by the model. The ﬁrst
and second subsections deal with evidence that the model explains, while the third
and fourth deal with evidence that motivates the assumption of a rising speciﬁcity of
capital.
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Figure 1: Corporate earnings as percentages of gross value added,
1971-2006.
2.1 Earnings
The top series in Figure 1 and its accompanying regression line (with t-statistics in
parentheses) show an upward trend in corporate earnings as a percentage of value
added in the corporate sector from 1971 to 2006. This trend is not due to changes
in the tax code, as shown by the lower series in the ﬁgure, which removes taxes paid
on corporate income, production, and income. Indeed, the trend lines indicate that
after-tax earnings have grown more rapidly than before-tax earnings.4
Figure 2 shows the average rate of return on capital for seven major countries as
compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The overall average across the seven countries rises from 13.1 percent in 1977 to 16.2
4We compute the corporate earnings share using the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007) as the sum of proﬁts before taxes
on corporate income (table 1.14, line 11), net interest (table 1.14, line 9), and capital consumption
(table 1.14, line 2) divided by gross value added (table 1.14, line 1). After-tax earnings are computed
similarly, except that proﬁts after taxes on corporate income (table 1.14, line 13) replace before-tax
proﬁts in the calculation.





















Figure 2: The rate of return on business-sector capital for seven OECD
countries, 1977-2003.
percent by 2003, with only Canada and Japan not seeing increases over the period.5
And though the rate of return on business capital is not precisely the same object
as plotted in Figure 1, this international evidence suggests that the upward trend in
e a r n i n g si sn o tj u s tac h a r a c t e ristic of U.S. corporations.
5The returns to capital are from December issues of the OECD Economic Outlook (1993, 1997,
1998; annex table 25) for 1977-1997. Blanchard (1996) uses these same data in an earlier investigation
of proﬁt rates and capital shares. The OECD construct st h er a t eo fr e t u r na sG D Pi nt h eb u s i n e s s
sector less total compensation of business employees and unpaid family workers, divided by the
business sector’s capital stock. The OECD suspended publication of the return to capital with the
1998 print version of the Economic Outlook, but continues to maintain the components needed to
update the series. We did this, after consulting with the OECD on data and methods, for 1998-2003
and joined the results to the series in the earlier print versions.
52.2 The management premium and Tobin’s Q
The solid line in Figure 3 shows that Tobin’s Q’s among exchange-listed ﬁrms has
risen from 1971-2005, as has the skill premium.6 The two series have a correlation
coeﬃcient of 0.68 in their overlapping years. Of course, the returns to schooling are
a weak proxy for the management premium, and trends in manager’s real compen-
sation may be more telling. Direct evidence on the management premium provided
in Figures 4 and 5 of Frydman and Saks (2007) show that managerial earnings are
strongly correlated with the S&P 500 index and, hence, with Tobin’s Q.
McGrattan and Prescott (2001) have argued that taxes explain the rise in Tobin’s
Q since, say, 1960. We doubt that taxes play a large role because Tobin’s Q was
about as high in the early 1900s as it was in the early 1970s (Wright 2004, Figure 5),
and yet taxes were at their lowest early in the 20th century — certainly lower than
today. Figure 3 suggests there may be a single explanation for the rise in Q and in
the skill premium.
2.3 Labor turnover
While the previous two subsections describe facts that the model explains, the next
two subsections document indirect evidence of increased speciﬁcity of human capi-
tal, namely evidence that labor turnover has declined, and evidence that occupation
codes have proliferated Although our model does not generate labor turnover, it is
commonly agreed that speciﬁc capital is a major deterrent to labor turnover. And
while we do not explicitly consider product variety, the presumption is that increased
industry speciﬁcity and increased occupational speciﬁcity must reduce the number of
ﬁrms that can use a given worker’s services.
Labor turnover fell dramatically during the 20th century. Figure 4, which shows
annual job separation rates from 1971 to 2006 using various sources demonstrates
this fact for the United States.7 Mincer and Higuchi (1988) oﬀer evidence that labor
6For Tobin’s Q, we use fourth quarter observations underlying Hall (2001, p. 1197) for 1978-
1999, and join them with estimates compiled by Andrew Abel to bring the series forward to 2006.
Hall computed Q as the ratio of the value of ownership claims on the ﬁrm less the book value of
inventories to the reproduction cost of plant and equipment, with the latter inferred via a standard
perpetual inventory of observed physical investment and a depreciation rate of 10 percent per year.
Abel calculates Q as the ratio of net ownership claims to physical assets as reported in the Flow of
Funds data. The “skill premium” series shows the relative returns to 16 versus 12 years of schooling
for men from 1971 to 1995 from Goldin and Katz (1999). Since the Goldin and Katz observations
are generally decadal, we interpolate between them to obtain an annual series for 1971 to 1995.
7The turnover data given by the solid line are for the manufacturing sector and include job
separations due to quits, layoﬀs, and discharges. They are from the Monthly Labor Review of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for 1971-80. We then linearly interpolate between the observation
for 1980 and the next available BLS estimate in 2000, which marks the start of a new initiative
at the BLS to collect job turnover data. The dotted line from 1971-1980 shows job separations in
which a worker changed sectors from Jovanovic and Moﬃtt (1990, table 4, p. 844), and is continued
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Figure 3: The skill premium and Tobin’s Q, 1971-2006.
turnover fell in Japan over the 1971-1985 period as well. We interpret this rising
attachment of workers to ﬁrms as the result of a rising speciﬁcity of their human
capital which, itself, derives from the increase in technological variety. Equations
(13)-(15) of Dagsvik, Jovanovic and Shepard (1985) show how the variance of match
quality between a ﬁrm and a worker rises with the heterogeneity of the technologies
that ﬁrms use. The model we shall present generates no turnover, but if ﬁrm-speciﬁc
skills have indeed become more important, then it will take a larger sectoral shock
for a worker to be displaced.
In interpreting the pattern in Figure 4 as evidence for rising speciﬁcity, we have
implicitly assumed the following background model of labor turnover: The quality of
the match between the asset and the ﬁrm is what Lippman and McCall (1981) call
using separation rates for all sectors based on March issues of the Current Population Survey (CPS)
from Stewart (2002, table 1). Moscarini and Vella (2003), also using the CPS, ﬁnd that mobility
across 3-digit sectors declined from 1971-2000. Kambourov and Manovskii (2008), however, using a
smaller sample from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics that excludes public employees, report a
modest increase in occupational mobility over the same period.










Figure 4: Annual labor turnover rates, 1971-2006.
an ‘inspection good.’ By this they meant that the quality of the match is discovered
before the match forms, and no subsequent deterioration or improvement of that
quality occurs thereafter.8 In the face of other shocks, then, a dispersed distribution
of the quality of the match over possible assignments means that those matches that
do form are further in the right tail and that such matches will survive a greater range
of outside shocks — shocks to demand and to the prices of other inputs for example.
Thus as the dispersion of match qualities rises over time while the amplitude of the
other shocks remains roughly constant, labor turnover ought to fall.
The rising specialization of the labor force is also reﬂe c t e di na nu p w a r dt r e n d
in the number of occupations in the occupational classiﬁcation system. The number
of occupations stood at 441 in 1970, at 503 in 1990, and 509 in 2000 (U.S. Census
Bureau 2003, pp. 4-5). Indeed, if both human and physical capital have become
8Jovanovic and Moﬃt (1990) assume, in contrast, that the quality of the match is an ‘experience
good’ in the sense that its quality is revealed only after the match is experienced for a period. In
such a model, a secular rise in the dispersion of match quality would have the eﬀect opposite to that
which we are assuming here, namely, a secular rise in the dispersion of match quality would cause
labor turnover to rise.












Figure 5: Gini coefficients for counts by occupation code, 1970-2000.
more ﬁrm speciﬁc, we might also ﬁnd that the workforce has become more uniformly
distributed across occupations. The Gini coeﬃcients shown in Figure 5 for occupation
counts from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Set (IPUMS) based on decadal U.S.
censuses from 1970 to 2000 suggest that this could well have been the case.
Importantly, labor turnover has declined while the turnover of managers has risen,
as Kaplan and Minton (2006), and Lucier et. al (2007) document. Between 1995 and
2006, annual CEO turnover has grown from 11% to 15% in North America, from 3%
to 15% in Europe, stayed ﬂat at 15% in Japan and grown from 5% to 10% in the
rest of Asia/Paciﬁc (Lucier, Wheeler and Habbel 2007, Figure 2, their Figure 1 shows
that acquisitions were not the main driver of this rise). Kaplan and Minton (2006)
report similar, but slightly less dramatic numbers for the U.S. Fortune 500 companies
over the period 1992-2005. All this suggests that inputs have become speciﬁcr e l a t i v e
to the managerial inputs that are combined with them.
92.4 Management and the ‘assembly’ of the ﬁrm
The last century has seen a rise in the role of the manager (Nelson 1995), and the last
30 years have produced a rise in venture capitalism. The venture capitalist, especially,
focuses on the formative stage of a business. The term “assembly” is supposed to
represent the stage at which the ﬁrm has negative cash ﬂows, a stage that every ﬁrm
goes through at the outset. The rising importance of the process of assembly itself
originates in our demand for a more rapid succession of new products.
A venture capitalist, together with the founder of a ﬁrm, assembles assets around
an idea. The idea belongs to the ﬁrm, and the people and assets should be suited
to the implementation of that idea. If the right team and right assets are assembled,
the ratio of market to book value of the ﬁrm at IPO will be high.
An existing ﬁrm also must periodically move to new activities and new products.
B a n k i n g ,f o re x a m p l e ,i so n ep l a c ew es e ec l e a re x a m p l e so fh o wﬁrm-speciﬁc capital,
both physical and human, are assembled. Before buying a building, a retail bank
wants to know if the likely customers will value its products. Management studies
t h ed e m o g r a p h i c st os e ei ft h eb u i l d i n gi sag o o dm a t c hf o rt h eb a n k ’ sn e e d s .
An investment bank will sometimes bid for an entire team of analysts from another
bank. Before doing so, its management evaluates whether that team’s human capital
is a good match for the bank’s own needs. For example, management will want to
know if the team has expertise in those areas where its own sales force specializes.
If the market for used capital was liquid, evaluative expertise would not matter —
buying the wrong building or hiring the wrong people could be reversed without cost.
But informational and other frictions make it costly to trade used equipment and to
move people around. Our model will assume that the only role of the manager is that
of assembling the ﬁrm’s assets. Our model emphasizes the rise in the manager’s value
added. In that sense it is consistent with Gabaix and Landier (2008) who also argue
that the value added by at least the top managers has risen because the stock-market
value of the ﬁrms they manage has risen over the past 30 years.
3E x a m p l e
The following example of a single auction shows how speciﬁcity translates into a
division of rents. The model in Section 4 will place this into an equilibrium setting,
and Section 5 will present simulations of the model.
Consider a second-price auction for one asset, “capital,” with two ﬁrms bidding




1 with prob. 1
2
z0 with prob. 1
2.
10The winner of the auction pays what the loser has bid, and so it is optimal to bid
one’s own value. Therefore we have the following three types of outcomes:
1. Both bidders draw z =1 . All rents go to capital; the bidders get nothing,
2. Both ﬁrms draw z = z0. Again, all rents go to capital, and
3. One ﬁrm draws z =1 , the other draws z = z0. Capital gets z0, and the winning
bidder gets 1 − z0.









W ep l o tt h e s et h r e eq u a n t i t i e sa saf u n c t i o no fz0 in Figure 6.
Speciﬁcity of capital.–The speciﬁcity of capital can be measured as 1−z0.A sz0
falls and capital gets more speciﬁc, output falls, but the share of the ﬁrm rises more
than enough to oﬀset this decline. Thus output falls but the value of ﬁrms rises. This
explains why the value of businesses as measured by Q c a nr i s ei nt h em i d s to fa
productivity slowdown.
In our model, the capital of managers is completely general — their function is
solely to evaluate the factors and they can perfectly evaluate any item that they
bid for. It is the quality of the match between the factors themselves and the ﬁrm
that widens. That is, it is the capital of the workers and machines that becomes
more speciﬁc. Contrast this explanation to that of LSV. In their model it is the
w o r k e r st h a ta r eh o m o g e n e o u sa n dt h em a n a g e r st h a th a v em a t c h - s p e c i ﬁc quality. In
modeling the IT period (which they date the same way that we do), they assume
that the fraction of managerial human capital that is general to all ﬁrms rises. The
speciﬁc component is tied to a ﬁrm and to a particular technological vintage. They
assume that IT raises disembodied progress relative to the embodied part, thereby
raising the portion of managerial human capital that is general to all ﬁrms. Thus the
building blocks of the two models are diﬀerent. In section 2.3 we documented the rise
in managerial turnover and the fall in worker turnover.
4M o d e l
A ﬁrm’s production function.–The ﬁrm’s inputs are management and “broad capital”
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Figure 6: The expected shares of the bidders and the asset.
where the zi are the qualities of each of the k units of capital that a ﬁrm’s manager
has assembled. The managers task is to buy the best inputs as cheaply as possible.
Capital is heterogeneous. The quality of the i’th unit of capital, zi, is purely ﬁrm-
speciﬁc, so that capital has no hierarchical quality dimension. Moreover, a manager
can see zi before he bids for the i’th unit of capital.
Second-price auctions.–Each unit of k sells in its own second-price auction un-
related to any other auction.9 Consider such an auction in which there are m ﬁrms
bidding. Suppose there are K units of capital in the economy, and there are M man-
agers who also own their ﬁrms or operate them in the interest of their shareholders.
Assume that every manager takes part in the same number of auctions, λ.T h e nt h e
total number of bidders in the economy is λM. Therefore, each unit of capital will





A manager maximizes the expected dividends and, hence, the value of the ﬁrm to
the risk-neutral shareholders. So, m managers bid for a single unit of capital in
9Under certain conditions, a whole range of auctions (including the second-price auction) yield
the same, maximal expected revenue to the auctioneer (Myerson 1981). The second-price auction is
the simplest to analyze.
12a second-price, sealed-bid auction (i.e., the object goes to the highest bidder who
pays the second-highest bid). Although they target other issues, Julien, Kennes and
King (2000) relate closely to our model because they too model the labor market
as a collection of auctions in which multiple ﬁrms bid for the services of individual
workers.
Idiosyncratic match quality.–Capital and ﬁrms are ex ante the same, but the
quality of the match between assets and managers is random and unknown. Let
F (z) be the distribution of z. Firms value a given unit of capital diﬀerently, and this
is what we mean by the “ﬁrm speciﬁcity” of capital. A manager learns the match
quality z only after he commits to attending the auction for the asset in question.
Although a worker’s productivity in various ﬁrms can diﬀer for many reasons, the
m a i nr e a s o n ,a sw es e ei t ,i st h a tﬁrms use diﬀerent technologies and produce diﬀerent
goods.
4.1 Analysis of a single auction
Let the subscript j ∈ {1,...,m} index the bidders in the auction for this object. A
manager has a private signal about the productivity (in his ﬁrm only) of the capital
good. Each manager has a perfect private ex-ante signal about his ex-post private
value zi of owning the object. In a second-price auction the ﬁrm’s own bid aﬀects
only the probability that it wins the object, but not what it actually pays. Moreover,
the zi do not have an unknown common component. Hence, the dominant strategy
for a manager is to bid
bi ≡ zi.
A ﬁrm that wins the auction pays the price qi =m a x j6=i zj. The winning ﬁrm’s
proﬁt and dividend is
δi = zi − qi.
Determining the division of the rents.–Let
F (z) = C.D.F. of z in the population of all matches.
The distribution of the winning ﬁrm’s z is Fm (z). Therefore the expected output of











for q ∈ [0,z],
13so that the expected price paid conditional on z is











E (q | z,m)dF
m (z), (4)
and the ex-ante expected proﬁt on the deal, δ, going to the winning bidder is
δ = y − α. (5)
The eﬀe c to far i s ei nm.–We shall endogenize m presently. But ﬁrst let us see
how changes in this variable aﬀect the rents when the parameters are held ﬁxed. A
rise in m unambiguously raises q, but it also raises the maximum z, and so the eﬀect
on δ is ambiguous. In general, how the change in m will inﬂuence the distribution of
the diﬀerence between the two highest observations depends on the hazard rate of F.
If z is bounded, however, then a suﬃciently high m shrinks δ to zero.
Example.–Suppose F is the uniform distribution on [0,1]. In the case where z is
uniformly distributed,
E (q | z,m)=














In this case, then, the decrease in δ and the increase in α are both monotonic in m.
Aggregation over auctions.–Summing (1) over all K auctions, aggregate output
is






Dividing both sides by K and letting K become large, the law of large numbers
implies the following:
• Productivity.–Output per unit of k, Y
K,c o n v e r g e st oy in (3),
• Share of managers.–This share converges to δ/y, where δ is given by (5),
• Share of other factors.–The share of K in output converges to α/y, where α is
given by (4), and
14• Tobin’s Q.–If a ﬁrm had just a single asset, its Q would simply be the expected
value of the ﬁrm’s dividends divided by the purchase price of its capital: z
pk.
Aggregate Q does not depend on how assets are distributed over ﬁrms, but is






This corresponds to the construction of the variable plotted in Figure 3, calcu-
lated as the sum of share values divided by the sum of book values.
4.2 Endogenizing M and K
There are two periods, ‘0’a n d‘ 1’ and there is no aggregate risk. Agents are born
alike, with a utility function
U (C0)+βU (C1),
where C0 and C1 are the ﬁrst and second period consumptions. Each agent has a
ﬁrst-period endowment ω of the consumption good that he can consume or convert
one-for-one into K,o rc o n v e r ti n t oM at a cost of φ. A safe asset exists and the rate
of interest is r.
Auctioneers.–Any agent can host an auction for someone else’s unit of K.A u c -
tion outcomes are costlessly and fairly insurable. Competitive auction dealers in K





for a unit of K today and earn an expected sale of α in the second period for each
unit of K that they now buy. Agents hold a representative portfolio of these auction
dealers, and the portfolio yields a safe return r.
Firm formation and “IPO”.–As in Diamond (1982), a person cannot use his own
K in his production function — he must go to an auction and buy K there in the
way that we have described in Section 4.1. Each unit of M t a k e sp a r ti nλ auctions.
The probability of winning any single auction is 1/m a n ds oau n i to fM expects to
win λ/m auctions altogether. The agent compiles M units of management capital in
period 0 and at once ﬂoats his ﬁr mi na nI P Oi np e r i o d0 .T h eﬁrm’s price at IPO is
just the period-0 expectation of the value of the claims to the dividend that the ﬁrm
(which the agent assembled) will pay in period 1.Au n i to fM delivers participation
in λ auctions and δ in proceeds from every auction won. The probability of winning







15where pM is also the price per unit of M. The portfolio of all IPOs also yields a safe
return of r. Thus both assets will be subsumed in the consumer’s budget constraint
by a discounting of future consumption purchases at the rate r.
Consumer lifetime budget constraint.–The numeraire in the lifetime budget con-
straint is current consumption. The agent’s resources are his endowment, ω,a n d





C1 + K + φM = ω + pKK + pMM. (10)
T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 1 0 )a r er e s o u r c e s ,a n dt h el e f t - h a n ds i d ea r ee x p e n d i t u r e s .
The equilibrium ratio pM/pK is the ‘management premium.’
Assets.–There are two assets: Claims to the revenues of auction houses, and
claims to the dividends of assembled ﬁrms. The portfolio of all auction houses is a
safe asset, as is a claim to the revenues of assembled ﬁrms.
First-order conditions.–After eliminating the Lagrange multiplier on (10), the
FOC with respect to K is,
1
1+r
α =1 , (11)













Demand = Supply.–All agents consume the same, c0 and c1 which, therefore, also
denote aggregate consumption in the two periods. In the second period the goods
market clears and all output is consumed:
C1 = yK. (14)
The lifetime budget constraint (10) must hold when aggregate values of the variables
are substituted into it. Finally the asset market must be in equilibrium when the
values of aggregate consumption are substituted into the ﬁrst-order condition (13)
for C0 and C1. A further condition is the bidding proportions equation (2).
An upward-sloping supply curve of M.–To keep the model simple, we retain the
representative agent and assume an aggregate congestion cost in the creation of M.
That is,
φ = φ(m),
16where m satisﬁes (2) evaluated at the economy-wide ratio M/K that each agent
takes as given. We assume that φ
0 > 0, which is a type of congestion externality
(pecuniary or non-pecuniary) in creating M, perhaps because it requires the presence
of an unmodeled scarce input.10
Equilibrium.–The endogenous variables are m,r,α,δ,y,c0,c 1,K,a n dM,a n d
they must solve (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), and (14). Some
of these equations are redundant — being implied by the other equations — but they
all must hold.



















Thus φ(m) is also the management premium.
Q and the management premium.–A simple relation holds between the two: com-






We thus ﬁnd that a rise in m raises Q and the management premium.
Manipulation of (18) leads to the following useful relation between the growth
















10Another way to have the same eﬀect would have been to endow each agent with a diﬀerent φ.
The low-φ agents would then be the ones opting for management, the high-φ agents would opt for
creating K. This would lead to a nondegenerate distribution of managerial incomes and to more
complicated algebra but the economics would stay roughly the same. The two formulations have
roughly similar positive implications but radically diﬀerent normative ones. The simpler, congestion
route leads to the conclusion that competition creates too much M relative to the planner’s optimum
but, as we just noted, it is hard to distinguish this empirically from the case where the equibrium
is optimal and therefore we shall make no normative inferences whatsoever.

























εφ,m = εδ,m − εα,m − 1,
and where εi,j denotes the elasticity of variable i with respect to variable j.
4.3 The eﬀect of a rise in the speciﬁcity of capital
The challenge in ﬁtting both the growth in Q and the rise in the skill premium is
implicit in (19). Over our 1971-2006 sample, the growth of the skill premium (i.e.,
dφ





was only 0.08. On the other
hand
dQ
Q averaged at 0.03. Then εφ,m would need to be around 0.008, i.e., essentially
zero.
The model has a hard time generating this quantitatively because for φ to be
unresponsive to m requires that m be so large that virtually all the expected rents in
an auction go to the asset and virtually none to the ﬁrm, i.e., when m is already very
high. But this would produce a level of Q quite close to unity, and so we could ﬁtt h e
trend in Q only by substantially underpredicting its sample average. The simulations
will bear this out.
Now consider the experiment that we performed when analyzing the example in
Section 3: Raise σz by taking an inferior distribution of z with a longer left tail. Such
ar i s ei nσz raises δ(m) and lowers α(m). This also has the eﬀect of raising Q in (7).
Therefore the management premium rises, creating the incentive to create more M
and less K,s ot h a tm will rise to oﬀset this eﬀect partially. But φ
0 > 0 means that
the rise in m will not fully oﬀset the initial stimulus, and therefore the eﬀect will be
ar i s ei nb o t hQ and the management premium — see Figure 7. The ﬁgure plots both
sides of (15).
When σz rises from σ1 to σ2, the right-hand side of (15) — call it the demand curve
— rises, whereas its left-hand side — call it the supply curve — remains unchanged. And
m must rise to restore equilibrium as illustrated in Figure 7. The presumed rightward
shift of the demand curve is hard to show in general, but will be true when, in the
next section, we take a mean-preserving spread of a uniformly distributed z.
How can Q rise permanently? The value of assembled ﬁrms reﬂects both K and
M, but only K is on the books and only K enters the replacement of a ﬁrm’s assets
as accountants have been calculating it. In the model, M is homogeneous; what we
believe really causes φ to rise with m is the heterogeneity of managerial talent and
a non-degeneracy in comparative advantage in supplying M. I ns u c haw o r l d ,t h e
most talented managers would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to manage even when the unit return
to M is just slightly above that of the unit return to K. But as we move down
the skill distribution or, rather, as we attract people whose comparative advantage
in supplying M is not that high, we must raise the price. Thus the supply of M is
positively sloped, even in the long run, or at least for as long as the distribution of
managerial talents does not change.
18 m  0 
  RHS | σ2 
  RHS | σ1  
φ(m) 
 m1   m2 
Figure 7: Comparative statics in (15): The effect on m of a rise in σz
from σ1 to σ2.
5 Simulations






,s ot h a t
the mean of z is unity and its range is σ.T h e p a r a m e t e r σ indexes the speciﬁcity
of capital, and we shall assume that it gradually rises over the post-1970 period.
Applying the same logic as for equation (6),
























































(m +1 )+m − 1
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19which increases to inﬁnity as m approaches A/B. That is, the positively sloping curve























For the simulations we take the actual solution for m in (21). The forcing variable
will be σ which we shall make a linear function of time:
σ = β0 + β1t.
These parameters (β0,β1) will be chosen to minimize a squared deviation criterion
between the model and the following variables:
Earnings –Expected output per unit of K and economy-wide TFP is















































Simulation results.– Figure 8 shows the model’s ﬁt for three series of interest:
after-tax earnings (panel a), the management i.e., skill premium (panel b), and To-
bin’s Q (panel c), using values for the key model parameters (A, B, λ,a n dσ). The
parameters were chosen to meet a weighted least squares ﬁtting criterion across the
three observables, with the weights given by the inverse of the variances of the under-
lying de-trended series. The observables are given by the dashed lines and the model’s
predictions by the solid lines. This criterion ﬁts after-tax earnings and the skill pre-
mium12 well, but does not capture the sharp rise in Tobin’s Q. T h i si sb e c a u s em
12The model also captures pretty well the rise in the management premium as reported by Fryd-
man and Saks (2007), Figure 5.
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                                                   (a)                                                                                             (b)
                                                    (c)                                                                                             (d)    
         
                                         Model settings:
                                        A = 60.134,  B=0.422,  λ = 3.977, σ = 0.23 + 0.0074 t.  
Figure 8: SIMULATED MODEL AND ACTUAL DATA.(panel d)13 does not rise quickly enough under this parameterization to ﬁt Q while
maintaining direct proportionality with the management premium, which does not
vary as widely as Q.
Table 1 presents the intercept and slope coeﬃcients for OLS regressions run
through the estimated series and actual data displayed in panels (a), (b), and (c)
Table 1. Goodness of Fit in Simulations, 1971-2006
Dependent Variable
After-Tax Earnings Skill Premium Tobin’s Q
Model Data Model Data Model Data
constant 14.497 18.495 1.306 1.344 1.182 0.538
time trend 0.318 0.133 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.045
no. obs. 36 36 36 36 36 36
Note: All coeﬃcient estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
of Figure 8. These coeﬃcients indicate that the simulations overﬁt the actual data
considerably for after-tax earnings, overﬁt the data slightly for the skill premium,
and underﬁtT o b i n s ’ sQ .
6 The role of management and the concept of cap-
ital used in our model
We follow Prescott and Visscher (1980, ‘PV’) and model organization capital as
information with an emphasis on the managerial function of assembling the most
productive assets. Assembly takes place at auctions between randomly paired ﬁrms
and workers. The matches that form at these auctions contain what one may call
organization capital — capital formed by managers on behalf of ﬁrms for which they
work. Firms pay managers to accumulate this capital.
There are two diﬀerences between PV’s concept of organization capital and ours.
First, in PV, a ﬁrm hires a worker and then screens that worker to determine which
task (there are only two tasks and each ﬁrm requires both) matches the worker better.
Second, and less essential, in PV matching occurs between workers and tasks, not
workers and ﬁrms. In both models, then, organization capital consists of information
about the quality of a match. The diﬀerence is that in PV it takes time for the parties
13This panel contains only the model’s prediction for m; we have no direct empirical proxy for m.
22to the match to discover that quality whereas in our model the quality is known by
inspection at the auction, before the bidding starts.
In our model, a mean-preserving spread of z implies that there is no change in
the quality of the average match, but that there is a rise in output of the economy
when people are matched optimally as in the mechanism that our model assumes.
We argued that this mean preserving spread is a natural consequence of a rise in
specialization, but a critical component in the rise of productivity on the matches
that form is the process by which assets are allocated to the ﬁrm, i.e., the auction
process.
Unmeasured capital plays a key role in several models. Atkeson and Kehoe (2004)
and LSV model exogenously-evolving TFP for each vintage of ﬁrms, and they call that
TFP organization capital. Brynjolfsson and Yang (2002), Hall (2000), Atkeson and
Kehoe (2005), and Laitner and Stolyarov (2003) emphasize the role of unmeasured
capital in raising stock prices.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have argued that the division of labor and the ﬁrm speciﬁcity of human capital
are driven primarily by the proliferation of technologies. This implies that the size
of the rents to a successful match have grown relative to the rents in an average
match. Of itself, this implies nothing about the division of those rents. But given
how ﬁrms actually do form — founders, managers and venture capitalists assemble
those assets needed to run the technology at hand — the growth in the rents may
largely be appropriated by the owners of the ﬁrm and by the managers.
Our model used these ideas to explain the experience of the past 40 years. We
argued that product variety has grown over the past 35 years and with it, technological
variety. We argued that this had raised the inter-worker dispersion of comparative
advantage in using diﬀerent technologies and in making diﬀerent products, but that
the additional rents went mainly to ﬁrms and managers. This in turn explained the
secular rise in ﬁrms earnings, their Tobin’s Qs, and the premium earned by their
managers.
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8 Appendix
Derivation of (21).–Equation (15) reads












leading to the quadratic





























m − σλA =0
leading to (21).

















































which is increasing in σ.
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